Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking? by Mariani, Fabio
Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking?
Fabio Mariani
To cite this version:
Fabio Mariani. Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking?. Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, 2007, 84 (2), pp.609-630. <10.1016/j.jdeveco.2007.02.001>. <halshs-00186460>
HAL Id: halshs-00186460
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00186460
Submitted on 9 Nov 2007
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Migration as an antidote to rent-seeking?∗
Fabio Mariani
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON-SORBONNE†
This draft: January 2007
Abstract
We develop a new mechanism through which skilled migration may influence eco-
nomic performance in the sending country. If agents can choose between acting as
rent-seekers and engaging in productive activities, and only productive skills are ex-
portable, a positive probability of migration (to a more secure economy) reduces the
relative expected returns from rent-seeking, thus decreasing the proportion of skilled
workers who opt for ”parasitic” activities. Such an improvement in the allocation of
talent may prevail over the loss of skilled workers due to outmigration. However, we
show that this result is not robust to the introduction of endogenous protection. If pro-
ductive workers share their resources between accumulation of productive capital and
investment in security, prospective migration may induce a weaker protection against
rent-seeking, which in turn might depress average income in the source economy.
JEL classification: D72; F22; O1.
Keywords: Rent-seeking; Skilled migration.
1 Introduction
Rent-seeking and skilled migration (the so-called ”brain drain”) are two common features
of less developed economies. Rent-seeking can take different forms: corruption, bribery,
excessive bureaucracy, crime, insufficient protection of property rights, lack of political cul-
ture and meritocracy, malfunctioning institutions, etc. As shown by Mauro (1995), who
supplies some data on the diffusion of corruption (and the like) around theWorld, develop-
ing countries are severely affected by this kind of pathology. On the other hand, Docquier
and Marfouk (2004) provide estimates of migration rates by skills and by sending country:
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they observe that less developed countries display the highest brain drain rates and that,
in most cases, skilled migration has been increasing over the 1990-2000 decade.
Both of these problems are usually considered to be harmful for growth and economic
performance. Concerning rent-seeking, there is wide agreement that it exerts an adverse
effect on development; it can determine, for instance, amisallocation of productive abilities,
a wasteful employment of resources, or a decrease in investment rates (see Bardhan (1997)
for a survey, andMauro (1995) for an empirical assessment). Skilledmigration aswell, since
the pioneering contribution of Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), has usually been regarded as
a threat to economic growth and considered as an impoverishing flight of human capital.
More recently, several models of brain drain have challenged this view, pointing out that a
positive, although limited, emigration rate may be beneficial for the source economy: the
opportunity to migrate would raise the relative expected returns to higher education, thus
determining an inducement effect on schooling decisions; this brain gain (in terms of higher
average human capital) may prevail over the actual brain drain. As examples of this new
approach, we can cite Mountford (1997), Stark and Wang (2002) and Beine et al. (2001).
However, until now theoretical models have studied rent-seeking and skilled migration
separately, without trying to establish a link between the two problems. Thus, the possible
consequences of their interaction for economic development have been neglected.
In the present paper we want to allow for such an interaction and see how migration
prospects may influence rent-seeking. To do that, we follow several models of rent-seeking
like Acemoglu (1995), Murphy et al. (1993), Torvik (2002), Mehlum et al. (2003), Baland and
François (2000), and study the endogenous career choice between carrying out productive
(entrepreneurial) activities and engaging in parasitic activities (rent-seeking). In this kind
of framework, we introduce a new mechanism: given that productive skills are typically
less country-specific and more exportable than rent-seeking abilities, a positive probability
of migration to a richer and more ”virtuous” country can decrease the relative expected
returns to rent-seeking and therefore reduce the attractiveness of this career option, thus
leading to a smaller proportion of rent-seekers in the source economy. We find that this
more favorable allocation of talent can more than compensate the loss of skilled workers
due to outmigration and a positive income-maximizing migration rate does exist.
We also check how the picture changes once we allow for endogenous protection: pro-
ductive agents may in fact employ some of their resources to impede predation, thus re-
ducing the fraction of income that rent-seekers can take away from them. In such a case,
probabilistic migration to a country with less rent-seeking may weaken the incentive to
raise defensive barriers, in favor of the accumulation of ”portable” skills1. Therefore, after
migration, rent-seeking may be less widespread but more effective, so that the net effect of
migration on income becomes ambiguous: we identify some conditions under which the
1Broadly speaking, prospective migration might induce ”weaker institutions” in the sending country: since
they plan to work abroad, productive agents care less about the future quality of economic institutions at home.
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result of beneficial migration can be reversed.
Our theoretical results are partly supported by existing data. We will show that, for
a cross-section of countries, it is possible to detect a positive (negative) correlation be-
tween brain drain rates and the proportion of people who get engaged in productive (rent-
seeking) careers, while the brain drain does not appear to be negatively correlated with the
after-migration total incidence of rent-seeking.
Let us also underline that our explanation for a beneficial brain drain is entirely new: in
fact, we look at a wasteful allocation of talent as a factor of underdevelopment, while the
existing literature on brain drain and growth has focused on the insufficient accumulation
of human capital. In both approaches there is room for a potentially beneficial effect of
migration, since the probability of migration is higher for the more productive group (en-
trepreneurs vs rent-seekers, skilled vs unskilled), whose endogenous size is thus positively
affected. However, the two underlying mechanisms are very different2.
Finally, the kind of analysis we are going to develop can be also related to a couple of
papers by Docquier and Rapoport (2003a, b) on migration and ethnic discrimination. They
study the effects of skilled migration on an economy populated by two groups - an ethnic
minority and a dominant ethnic group - of exogenous size, with the majority levying a
discriminative tax on the educated minority. However, our work looks at a different kind
of rent-extraction (unrelated to ethnic discrimination), treats the relative size of the groups
as endogenous (it being the result of a career choice, and not the deterministic consequence
of ethnic identity), and introduces the possibility of self-protection by the vexed group.
The paper is then organized as follows. After this Introduction, Section 2 is devoted
to the presentation of some stylized facts on the relation between skilled migration and
rent-seeking. Section 3 presents and solves the basic model. Endogenous protection and
its implications are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 extends the model to allow for an
endogenous probability of migration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
Here, we want to use available cross-country data to check whether rent-seeking and the
probability of migration are correlated. Consistent with what has been put forward in the
Introduction, we look at two different aspects of rent-seeking: (i) the allocation of talent be-
tween rent-seeking and productive activities, that is the relative number of people engaged
in the two careers3, and (ii) the total incidence of rent-seeking, which takes also into account
the intensity of rent-seeking (i.e. the fraction of income that parasitic agents take away from
productive workers), and not only the size of the rent-seeking sector as measured by the
number of people who have opted for a rent-seeking career.
2In our model, the inducement effect determined by a positive chance of emigration acts through ”less
rent-seeking”, instead of ”higher education”.
3The expressions "allocation of talent" and "career choice" will be used interchangeably.
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2.1 Skilled migration and career choices (allocation of talent)
As a proxy for the probability of (skilled) migration, we use the migration rate for people
with tertiary education or more, which we will sometimes refer to as the brain drain rate
throughout this Section. Data on migration rates by skills are provided by Docquier and
Marfouk (2004) for a sample of about 200 countries.
To account for the allocation of talent, we follow Murphy et al. (1991), who use college
enrollment in law as a measure of talent allocated to rent-seeking, and college enrollment
in engineering as a proxy for talent allocated to entrepreneurship. Notwithstanding some
evident limits4, an indicator of this type, focusing on educational choices, captures quite
well the responsiveness of agents to the relative returns of alternative career options. Al-
though the source is the same - enrollment in tertiary education by field (UNESCO, 1998,
1999, 2006), our measure of the allocation of talent between alternative careers is slightly
different from Murphy et al. (1991); more precisely, we use enrollment in the fields of sci-
ences and engineering5 as a proxy for the choice of a productive career, while to quantify
howmany people opt for a rent-seeking career we consider enrollment in both law and reli-
gion6, since in several developing countries a sizable part of the bureaucracy has a religious
formation and quite often religious leaders act as rent-seekers.
We start by plotting tertiary education enrollment in the fields of science and engineer-
ing (in 19957) against brain drain rates (as of 1990) for the largest possible cross section of
countries8. The five-year lag has been chosen to deal with possible reverse causality issues:
a sizable brain drain may in fact be explained by an excess supply of productive skilled
workers. Moreover, in such a way most of the students are supposed to have taken the
decision about their field of specialization using also the information they had on current
migration possibilities. Figure 1 shows some positive correlation: countries with higher
skilled-migration rates are characterized by a higher fraction of students going for educa-
tion in "productive" fields. To summarize:
Stylized fact 1 Specialization in productive fields is positively correlated with skilled migration.
Figure 2 unveils the other side of the story: where the probability ofmigration is smaller,
there is a less favorable allocation of talent, and a larger fraction of people chooses to get
4Most lawyers and civil servants are supposed to be productiveworkers, and some bureaucracy is necessary
for the efficient functioning of an economic system.
5Sciences are: maths, computer sciences, natural sciences and health-related sciences. Engineering and
architecture are counted together.
6Religion is counted together with humanities and fine arts.
7We have chosen 1995 (or the closest year, when data for 1995 are not available) since UNESCO data have
not the same degree of disaggregation in more recent years (2000 and 2004): for instance, it is not possible to
know exactly how many students are enrolled in law, since the new "broad field" of aggregation puts together
law, business and social sciences.
8Subject to the following constraints: (i) the reliability rate of the brain drain estimates, as reported by
Docquier and Marfouk (2004, p.27), must be higher than 80%, (ii) as suggested by Murphy et al. (1991, p. 523),
only countries with more than 10000 students are included in the sample.
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Figure 1: Brain drain and enrollment in productive fields for a cross-section of 68 countries
trained for rent-seeking jobs (law and religion, in our approximation). In other words:
Stylized fact 2 Specialization in rent-seeking fields is negatively correlated with skilled migration.
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Figure 2: Brain drain and enrollment in rent-seeking fields for a cross-section of 65 countries
To summarize, we may say that available data seem to support the idea that a higher
migration probability corresponds to a better allocation of talent9.
2.2 Skilled migration and corruption ("perceived" rent-seeking)
In the Introduction, while talking about endogenous protection, we have put forward that
the total amount of rent-seeking can be higher after migration, even if the relative size of
9Before going on, let us underline that Figures 1 and 2 are built using all the available information, and
not only data relative to less developed countries. However, if we remove the most industrialized countries
from the sample, and keep only LDC’s, the quality of the results does not change: moreover, correlations are
even more evident. Results are also more clear-cut if we split the whole cross-section in regional subsamples
(America, Africa, Asia-Pacific and Europe). All this additional evidence is available upon request.
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the rent-seeking sector is reduced (i.e. even if a smaller proportion of workers has cho-
sen the "parasitic" career). But, how can we measure the total incidence of rent-seeking?
A suitable solution is represented by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), published by
Transparency International10, which describes " ... how international businessmen and fi-
nancial journalists perceive corruption ..." in different countries around the World. As it is
built, this index takes into account both the size of the rent-seeking sector and the intensity
of rent-seeking activities (corruption). Since the CPI score measures transparency, on a 0-10
scale, we use (10− CPI) as a proxy for rent-seeking.
Figure 3 shows that the correlation between skilled migration rates (in 2000) and per-
ceived rent-seeking (in 2005) is even, although weakly, positive. However, for brain drain
rates lower than 20 %, it is almost impossible to identify any kind of correlation. We are
then able to state the following:
DZA
AGO
BEN
BFA
BDICMRCOG
EGY
ETH KEN
MLI
MOR
NAM
NGA
ZAF
SDN
TZA
UGAZWE
CAN
CRI
CUB
DOM
SLV
HND
MEX
NIC
PAN
USA
ARG
BOL
CHL
COL
ECU
PRY
URY
AFG
AZE
CYP
HKG
IND
IDN
IRN
ISR
JAP
JOR
KWT
LBN
MYS
MNG
MMR
NPL
PAK
PAL PHL
SAU LKASYR
THA
TUR
ARE
YEM
AUT
BLR
BEL
BGR
HRV
CZE
DNK
EST
FIN
FRA
DEU
GRC
HUN
IRL
ITA
LVA
M A
NLD
NOR
POL
PRT
RUS
SLK
SVN
ESP
SWE CHE
MKD
GBR
YUG
AUS
NZL
PNG
0
2
4
6
8
re
n
t−
se
ek
in
g 
(T
I in
de
x, 
20
05
)
0 10 20 30 40
brain drain (%, 2000)
Figure 3: Brain drain and corruption (TI) for a cross-section of 95 countries
Stylized fact 3 There is no obvious correlation between corruption and skilled migration.
This confirms our guess that the allocation of talent to parasitic activities and the total inci-
dence of rent-seeking (corruption) may indeed follow different trajectories, thus justifying
an extension of our theoretical model to take into account endogenous protection.
Before going on, let us underline that a reverse causality is more than likely to play a role
in explaining a part of the relationships described in Figures 1-3. However, our theoretical
model only focuses on the effects of migration on rent-seeking.
3 The benchmark model
We start by considering a simple setting with exogenous protection: workers engaged in
productive activities cannot influence, by their choices, the fraction of income they lose
10Data are available on-line at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.
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when they are subject to rent-seeking pressures.
3.1 Autarky
We introduce a simple model of rent-seeking à la Acemoglu (1995). The economy is pop-
ulated by homogeneous agents (workers). Each worker is endowed with a productive
capacity h, that we can assimilate to human capital, and is allowed to make a (career)
choice between engaging in productive activities and becoming a rent-seeker11. Then, if
she chooses to become a productive worker, she will be able to produce (gain) h unities of
income. However, part of this income may be lost due to the effect of rent-seeking aggres-
sion by parasitic agents. More precisely, we model the rent-seeker/producer interaction as
a matching process: every producer may deal with at most one rent-seeker, who will take
away an exogenous fraction q (with 0 < q < 1) of her product12; we will refer to q as the
"extortion rate" associated with rent-seeking. If an agent decides to act as a rent-seeker, and
if she actually comes in contact with a productive worker, she will earn a rent qh.
As a consequence of the matching process, we have that if rent-seekers exceed pro-
ducers in size, there will be someone among the former who will not find any productive
workers to predate. If the opposite is true, with rent-seekers being outnumbered by pro-
ducers, there will be some of the latter who will avoid extortion.
We identify by p and (1− p) respectively the fraction of rent-seekers and the fraction of
productive workers that coexist in the economy. The equilibrium value of p arises endoge-
nously as a consequence of the career choice: it is determined as a value which equates
expected incomes from the two activities (agents are assumed to be risk-neutral). The ex-
pected revenue of the representative entrepreneur13 would be:
πE(p) =
{
(1− q p1−p )h if p < 12
(1− q)h if p ≥ 12
. (1)
With p = 0, entrepreneurs would be able to keep all their production. Thereafter, an in-
crease in p would result in an increased probability p/(1− p) to ”meet” a rent-seeker, and
then in a lower expected income. Finally, if p ≥ 1/2, predators are more numerous than
prey, and entrepreneurs keep only a fraction (1− q) of their production, regardless of p.
From the point of view of parasitic agents, they are sure to meet a productive agent,
collecting qh, as long as p ≤ 1/2. For p > 1/2, a crowding-in effect (acting through a de-
creasing probability (1− p)/p to be matched with a productive worker) will progressively
11In the real world, however, the same individual might carry out both rent-seeking and productive activi-
ties: the fact that a bureaucrat collects bribes cannot exclude that she also performs some productive tasks.
12For instance, we may think of a corrupted bureaucrat asking for a bribe or simply of extortion carried out
by an organized crime group.
13Throughout the rest of the paper, wewill sometimes use the term ”entrepreneur” to label the representative
productive worker, although she gains her income from her human capital, and not from physical capital.
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erode parasitic rents down to 0 (for p tending to 1)14. Therefore, rent-seekers’ profits can be
expressed as:
πRS(p) =
{
qh if p < 12
q
1−p
p h if p ≥ 12
. (2)
We assume that career choices are endogenous and irreversible, so that each worker has
to choose once and for all whether to engage in productive or parasitic activities.
If q < 1/2 there will not be any rent-seeking in the economy, since the entrepreneurial
career will turn out to be, for any p, more rewarding than the rent-seeking activity. But, as-
suming that q > 1/2, there will always be a positive fraction of rent-seekers in the economy,
and multiple equilibria may arise, as shown in Figure 4. Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu
(1995), Torvik (2002) and Mehlum et al. (2003), although resting on different explanations,
end up with the same kind of picture. And, as it has been widely discussed in those papers,
only one of the two equilibria with positive rent-seeking is stable (point E1 in Figure 4)15.
Our further analysis will focus on equilibria like E1; being characterized by a high fraction
of rent-seekers, they also better fit the case of less developed countries.
Figure 4: The allocation of talent: multiple equilibria
Solving πRS = πE, we can see that the high rent-seeking equilibrium we are dealing
with is characterized by p = q. An equilibrium like E2 would imply p = 1− q.
14However, if we assume (somewhat more realistically) that each rent-seeker can deal with η (> 1) en-
trepreneurs at once, the threshold value moves from 1/2 to 1/(1+ η).
15The stability analysis runs as follows (see for instance Murphy et al., 1993). Consider an equilibrium
like E2, and suppose now to be in a right neighborhood of E2: in this case returns to rent-seeking would be
higher than returns from productive activities, more workers would rationally choose to become rent-seekers,
p grows larger and the economy would be driven to E1. On the other side, assume that the economy is in a left
neighborhood of E2; in such a case expected income from entrepreneurship exceeds expected rents, workers
would have an incentive to get engaged in the productive career, and the economy would be driven toward
a state with no rent-seeking at all (p = 0), which may also be considered as a stable equilibrium, technically
speaking. In a right neighborhood of E1, instead, profits would be larger than rents, justifying an incentive to
choose entrepreneurship: by consequence p would decrease, leading the economy back to E1.
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3.2 Migration
To introduce migration, we assume that every agent who decides to work in the pro-
ductive sector has a positive chance of emigration m, while migration is not allowed for
rent-seekers. As we have already put forward in the Introduction, this assumption is not
unrealistic, since rent-seeking skills are very likely to be strongly country-specific, while
productive skills are not. In fact, high-skilled migration typically concerns scientists and
engineers, and not civil servants, lawyers and bureaucrats16.
Migration may be motivated by different reasons. Roughly speaking, the opportunity
to earn higher wages, net of migration costs and eventual skill depreciation, is the main rea-
son for labor mobility. However, many different factors may lie behind wage differentials.
Since we want to focus on the rent-seeking issue, we put aside technological explanations,
and assume that the foreign country is attractive because it protects property rights and/or
labor income more effectively than the sending country, so that qF < q. In Docquier and
Rapoport’s (2003) paper, wage differentials were neglected as well, to privilege an expla-
nation of migration based on the attractiveness of a discrimination-free country (from the
viewpoint of the ethnic minority).
The migration rate m, that for the moment we assume to be exogenous, can be deter-
mined by both internal and external policies. The emigration policy of the sending country
may in fact aim at controlling migration outflows, but it is more obvious to think that in-
ternational mobility is restricted by immigration authorities in the destination countries,
using instruments like quotas, visa policies, etc. Whatever the case, in the sending coun-
try productive workers face uncertainty in the sense that they have a probability m to be
accepted in the destination country, while with a probability (1−m) they will be forced to
stay home17.
Once probabilistic migration is taken into account, and assuming for the sake of sim-
plicity that after migration the number of rent-seekers will continue to exceed the number
of entrepreneurs, the expected income of the representative entrepreneur would be given
by:
πE(p,m) = [(1−m)(1− q) + m(1− qF)]h, (3)
while rent-seekers would expect to gain:
πRS(p,m) = q
(1−m)(1− p)
p
h. (4)
16A very nice example is provided by Murphy et al. (1991): Talleyrand was a bishop with a large tax income
in France, but when he escaped to the United States he acted as a successful entrepreneur. This is indeed a case
of ”career crossover” that we will not consider (career choices are irreversible in our setting), but illustrates
quite well how even the brightest rent-seeking skills are not exportable. However, rent-seekers may be foreign-
raised, as it still happens in many LDC’s.
17Being homogeneous, productive workers are randomly selected for migration. Otherwise, prospective
migrants are likely to undergo some kind of selection by skills.
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Probabilistic migration raises expected profits (through prospective foreign income)
and decreases rents (through tougher crowding-in: predators have a lower probability to
meet prey). As a consequence, we obtain the following Proposition:
Proposition 1 When the extortion rate q is exogenous, probabilistic migration to a more virtuous
country has a ”moralizing” effect on the allocation of talent in the home economy.
In fact, equating entrepreneurial profits (3) and rents (4), we get:
pM(m) =
(1−m)q
1−mqF , (5)
which is lower than the proportion of rent-seekers without migration, p. However, only a
fraction (1 − m) of the (1 − pM) productive workers remains in their home country, and
the after-migration predator/prey ratio becomes:
γM(m) =
q
1− q + m(q− qF) , (6)
which is always decreasing in m, and then it is lower than it would have been without
migration (γ = q/(1− q)). Therefore, probabilistic migration to a country with less rent-
seeking induces a more favorable allocation of talent in the home economy.
This finding, suggesting that more migration implies less rent-seeking, echoes Docquier
and Rapoport’s (2003) results, according to which migration prospects have a ”protective”
effect on the minority. However, in their model this effect runs through a lower discrimina-
tion tax rate, while in ours predation is not weaker (q is unaffected), but only less diffuse.
3.3 An optimal migration rate?
Above, we have been able to isolate a beneficial impact linked to general migration. How-
ever, if we think that the rent-seeking/production career choice concerns specially high-
skilled workers, we could easily interpret it as a brain gain linked to high-skilled migration.
Different from the existing literature (see for instance Mountford, 1997, Beine et al., 2001,
or Stark and Wang, 2002), this positive effect is not related to the accumulation of human
capital through education. However, dealing with homogeneous agents, we have not con-
sidered the possible brain drain effect, i.e. the potential shrinking of the highly educated
group due to migration opportunity. To cope with this problem, we can build a very simple
extension of our basic model, introducing explicitly heterogeneity by skills.
More precisely, we assume that in our model economy there is also a class of low-skilled
individuals. These agents are not given the choice to become rent-seekers, since the extrac-
tion of rents is assumed to require skilled labor18. As workers, they are characterized by a
very low productivity that allows them to produce only at a subsistence level, so that their
18As in the case, for instance, of corrupted bureaucrats.
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net income is equal to zero; as subsistence producers, they are ignored by rent-seekers19.
We assume that, before migration, for every skilled agent (rent-seeker or entrepreneur)
there are χ subsistence producers in the economy.
In such a stylized setting, we can look for an optimal (e)migration rate, i.e. that value
m∗ of m which maximizes a desirable objective function. We can propose two alternative
formulations for the objective function:
(i) the total number of productive skilled workers left in the home economy, that is given
by (1−m)(1− pM(m));
(ii) the after-migration average income of honest workers (productive skilled workers and
subsistence workers), i.e.
(1−m)[1− pM(m)](1− q)h
(1−m)[1− pM(m)] + χ .
Maximizing (1 − m)(1 − pM) could be desirable since growth, or prospective economic
performance in the sending economy may depend on the number of high-skilled, produc-
tive workers in the country20; it is also the simplest way to encompass both the brain drain
(through (1−m)) and the brain gain (through (1− pM)). Option (ii) looks like a very natu-
ral solution to identify an optimal m, it being very much in the spirit of a utilitarian welfare
function, where the utility (income) level of every group is weighted by its relative size.
It could also be interesting to consider a third kind of objective function: the after-
migration average income (including rents in the count). Such an objective would deserve
some attention as long as the identity of rent-seekers and entrepreneurs is anonymous a
priori, and the social planner feels committed to maximizing the well-being of the whole
population, regardless of their career choice: this case will be analyzed in Appendix B21.
However, we believe that functions (i) and (ii) are more interesting if we think that the
policy maker, on purely ethical grounds, should not care too much about the welfare of the
parasitic group; in this case the following Proposition holds:
Proposition 2 With probabilistic migration and an exogenous q, a strictly positive optimal migra-
tion rate does exist, if the intensity of rent-seeking in the foreign economy is sufficiently low.
In fact, under both objective functions (i) and (ii), m∗ is given by:
m∗ = max

0 ; 1− (1− qF)
√
q
q−qF
qF

 , (7)
and it is easy to check that m∗ is strictly positive if qF < 2− (1/q).
19In analogy with Docquier and Rapoport (2003): in their paper, uneducated minority members remain at
the subsistence level, thus escaping discriminatory taxation.
20Following for instance Mountford (1997), who considers an economy-wide growth externality which is
assumed to depend on the relative number of educated workers.
21To some extent, it could also have been interesting to include the welfare of successful migrants in the
objective function. However, in conformity with the existing literature, we prefer to limit our analysis to the
sending economy, to which emigrants do not belong any more.
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It is interesting to notice that, if migration is allowed to a rent-free country (qF = 0),
there will always be a positive migration rate which maximizes income (or growth) in the
source economy. It is in fact given by m∗ = 1− 1/2q.
Moreover, it is worth noting that m∗ is increasing in q: the higher the extortion rate in
the sending economy, the larger the optimal migration rate22.
4 Endogenous protection
The results we obtained in the previous Section look quite encouraging about a possibly
beneficial brain drain. Now, we want to check whether this kind of finding is robust to
the introduction of endogenous protection. Until now we have in fact assumed both q and
h to be exogenous, but this need not necessarily be the case. We could instead imagine
that there is a trade-off between the two. For example, in the case of physical capital, we
may say that the entrepreneur, before setting up her business, has to decide how to allocate
her resources between productive investments (machineries) and investments in protection
(like building walls to defend her property, hiring and training guards, or financing better
institutions). In the case of human capital, the scarce resource may be thought of as being
time, which can be allocated between accumulation of human capital (through education
or whatsoever) and some sort of political activity devoted to obtaining better protection of
property rights or to building a safer net of relationships (with bureaucrats, for instance).
Regardless of their nature, investments in protection are supposed to determine a lower q.
And in any case, a positive probability of migration to a more secure country will induce
entrepreneurs to invest more in productive skills and less in defensive activities, since they
obviously care less about security and the quality of institutions in their home country. As
a consequence, after migration the home economy may end up with a higher proportion
of productive workers (smaller size of the rent-seeking sector, p), but more intensity in
predation (higher q).
4.1 The extended model: autarky vs migration
To take explicitly into account the choice between these two different types of investments -
productive or defensive, we can give our model a simple two-period structure. The timing
of events goes as follows: the irreversible career choice is made at the beginning of the first
period (t), actual production and interactions between rent-seekers and entrepreneurs take
place during the second period (t + 1), while uncertainty about migration is cleared at the
beginning of the second period.
22In Appendix B we will also show that, not surprisingly, the optimal migration rate would be higher if rents
were included in the objective function. When adding rent-seekers to the computation of average income,
there is no additional "drain effect" to be accounted for: parasitic agents do not migrate and average rents,
depending directly on the predator/prey ratio, are always increasing in m
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Therefore, the investment choice takes place before uncertainty aboutmigration is cleared.
This is crucial for all the results that will be derived in this Section. An alternative timing
of events, with productive workers deciding about their protection effort after uncertainty
about migration is resolved, might be considered. However, it would not add anything
interesting to our previous analysis (carried out in Section 3 and based on an exogenous q),
since the investment in protection would not depend on the probability of migration23.
We also assume that during the first period every skilled worker who wants to engage
in productive activities is endowed with one unit of time: a fraction xt of this time can be
invested to build up future productive capacity according to ht+1 = xαt , where 0 < α ≤ 1;
the remainder of the time (1− xt) can be used to reduce qt+1 through a defensive effort24.
Dropping time indexes, the function qt+1 = f (1− xt) = F(xt) can be specified as:
q(x) = max
[
q¯− (1− x)ρ; 1
2
]
, (8)
where 1/2 < q¯ ≤ 1 and ρ ≥ 0. The parameter ρ accounts for the productivity of the
defensive effort (1− x) in reducing the fraction of income that is lost due to rent-seeking,
as well as the opportunity cost of shifting resources from protection to accumulation of
productive skills; in this sense ρmay be related to the quality of institutions in the economy.
It is easy to check that: limx→0 q(x) = max[q¯− ρ; 1/2] and limx→1 q(x) = q¯.
The function q(x) is depicted in Figure 5: the parameter ρ is crucial for determining its
slope. We would underline that for ρ = 0 the case of exogenous protection is reproduced:
q = q¯ does not depend on x. The lower bound 1/2 is binding as long as ρ > 1/2.
We assume for simplicity q¯ = 1. If no time is devoted to defense, the rent-seeker will
take all the production away from the worker; if all the time is spent building up defenses,
q may be driven down to 1/2 (entrepreneurs are not able to completely eliminate rent-
seeking relying only on their defensive effort). The representative worker will choose op-
timally x, in order to maximize her expected profits net of rent-seeking, that amount to
(1− q(x))xα.
In autarky the optimal choice would be
x∗ =
{
α/(1+α) if ρ ≤ 1/2
max[α/(1+α); 1− 1/2ρ] if ρ > 1/2 . (9)
The possibility of corner solutions in the second case is due to the fact that it is never opti-
mal to select an x lower than 1− 1/2ρ, since the implied decrease in production would not
determine any gain in protection (see Figure 5). To rule out this possibility (when ρ > 1/2),
23Under the assumption that rent-seekers continue to outnumber producers.
24We do not model explicitly neither the choice of the aggressive effort made by the rent-seeker, nor her
accumulation of skills. Grossman and Kim (1995) have a closed-economy model with endogenous efforts on
both the defensive and the offensive side. Docquier and Rapoport (2003a, b) consider that the discriminative
tax rate (that in their models plays the same role played by q in ours) is chosen by the rent-seeking ethnic
majority and cannot be influenced by the minority.
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Figure 5: The function q(x)
we would simply need to impose an upper bound to the values that the parameter ρ may
assume, namely ρ ≤ (α + 1)/2.
If the possibility ofmigration is taken into account, the fraction of time devoted to human
capital accumulation becomes:
x∗M =
{
x⋄M if ρ ≤ 1/2
max[x⋄M; 1− 1/2ρ] if ρ > 1/2
, (10)
where
x⋄M = min
[
α[m(1− qF) + (1−m)ρ]
(1+α)(1−m)ρ ; 1
]
. (11)
Notice that x∗M = x
⋄
M as long as ρ ≤ ρ¯, where:
ρ¯ =
(α + 1)−m(1−α)− 2mαqF
2(1−m) ,
while, to rule out corner solutions (x∗M = 1), we would simply need m to be lower than
m¯ = ρ/[α(1− qF) + ρ]. Throughout the remainder of this Section, we will assume, for ease
of presentation, that both ρ ≤ ρ¯ and m < m¯ hold.
It is easy to see that x∗M is a decreasing function of qF, while it increases withm: more se-
curity abroad or a higher probability of migration, both these factors induce weaker invest-
ments in protection and more accumulation of productive skills25. In particular it is clear
25In our analysis, human capital can be accumulated only through private investments in education, and
considering public education goes beyond our scopes. However, it is interesting to relate our contribution to
Poutvaara (2004): in his model an increasing international applicability of a given type of education encourages
private investments in this kind of skills (similar to our model, where x increases withm), but " ... governments
face an incentive to divert the provision of public education away from internationally applicable education
toward country-specific skills. This would mean educating too few engineers, economists and doctors, and too
many lawyers. [...] It could even allow for a Pareto-improvement". However, in Poutvaara’s model, country-
specific skills are not assumed to be employed in the rent-seeking sector.
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that x∗M is larger than x
∗ for every positive value of m: as we have already put forward,
easier migration puts more weight on expected income abroad, thus inducing a stronger
investment in portable skills and a smaller defensive effort.
Given the optimal (x, 1 − x) choice, we can find the equilibrium value of p, equating
expected profits and expected rents. In autarky, we solve:
(1− x∗)ρ(x∗)α = [1− (1− x∗)ρ] 1− p
p
(x∗)α , (12)
to get:
pǫ = 1− ρ
(1+α)
=
α + (1− ρ)
(1+α)
. (13)
When migration is taken into account, the ”career-arbitrage” condition
[(1−m)(1− x∗M)ρ+ m(1− qF)] (x∗M)α = [1− (1− x∗M)ρ]
(1− p)(1−m)
p
(x∗M)
α (14)
determines:
pǫ,M(m) =
α + (1− ρ) 1−m1−mqF
(1+α)
. (15)
For every m ∈ (0, m¯), pǫ,M is lower than pǫ but, to assess the moralization effect of migra-
tion, we need to look at the after-migration predator/prey ratio:
γǫ,M(m) =
pǫ,M
(1− pǫ,M)(1−m) =
α
(1−m) +
(1+α)(1− ρ)
(1−m)ρ+ m(1− qF) . (16)
The following Proposition would then hold:
Proposition 3 Provided that ρ is low enough, the ”moralization” effect of probabilistic migration
is preserved also under the assumption of endogenous protection.
To see that, consider γǫ,M: it is decreasing in m, until m = mˇwhere it gets a minimum. And
since:
mˇ =
[(1− ρ) +α][(1− ρ)− qF]− (1− qF)
√
α(1+α)(1− ρ)[(1− ρ)− qF]
[(1− ρ) +αqF][(1− ρ)− qF] , (17)
then: mˇ < m¯ for ρ > [
√
α(1+α)(1− qF) + (αqF/2)2 −α(1− qF/2)].
This result means that for low enough ρ’s, the predator/prey ratio is decreasing for
every admissible value of m, i.e. ∀m ∈ (0, m¯); non-monotonicity occurs only for higher
values of ρ. In the specific case of a rent-free destination country (qF = 0), we would
have that m¯ = ρ/(α + ρ) and γǫ,M(m) is monotonically decreasing in m as long as ρ ≤√
α(1+α)−α. Let us just recall that ρmeasures the opportunity cost of of diverting some
resources from defense to accumulation of productive capital; when both ρ andm are large,
property becomes poorly protected in the sending economy, since x is also high and this
has a sizable effect on q: this implies that the expected income of entrepreneurs is heavily
affected and the moralization effect stops working.
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4.2 The optimal migration rate
Let us now see if a positive optimal (income-maximizing) emigration rate m∗ does exist,
when protection is assumed to be endogenous.
In straight analogy with the case of exogenous protection, and keeping in mind that x∗M
is in turn a function of m, the quantity to be maximized may be one of the following:
(i’) the after-migration total income of high-skilled producers (obviously, net of rent-seeking),
given by: ΨM(m) = (1−m)(1− pǫ,M(x∗M))(1− q(x∗M))(x∗M)α;
(ii’) the after-migration average income of "honest" producers, i.e.:
(1−m)[1− pǫ,M(x∗M)](1− q(x∗M))h(x∗M)
(1−m)[1− pǫ,M(x∗M)] + χ
.
Let us consider the case with qF = 0: with an exogenous extortion rate q (see previous
Section), we were ensured that a strictly positive m∗ did exist. Under endogenous protec-
tion, things change; in fact, we can prove the following:
Proposition 4 If protection is endogenous and migration is directed to a rent-free economy, a
strictly positive value for m∗ may not exist if ρ exceeds a critical value ρ.
The claim of the above Proposition is easy to prove for function (i’). From ∂ΨM(m)/∂m = 0
(with ∂2ΨM(m)/∂m2 < 0), we obtain:
m∗ =
2α(1− ρ) + ρ(3− 4ρ) +α2 −√κ
4(1− ρ)(α + ρ) , (18)
where κ = α2(2+α)2 − 2αρ[2(α2 − 1) +α]− ρ2[4α(1+α)− 1].
It is easy to check that ∂m∗/∂ρ < 0: the optimal migration decreases with ρ. In particu-
lar, for m∗ to be strictly positive, we need simply that ρ < 1/2 = ρ. Therefore, for ρ ≥ 1/2,
m∗ would be equal to zero: if the sending economy is able to control its migration rate, the
optimal policy choice should be to keep its frontiers closed.
Furthermore, the condition ρ < 1/2 warrants the existence of a strictly positive value
of m (call it mˆ), which maximizes the absolute number of skilled workers not engaged in
rent-seeking, given by (1−m)(1− pǫ,M(x∗M))26. Just notice that m∗ < mˆ27, and ∂mˆ/∂ρ < 0.
As it will be proved in Appendix A, the claim of Proposition 4 applies also to case (ii’),
while it cannot be extended to an objective function which includes rent-seeking incomes28
(see Appendix B).
26Maximizing this product is probably a more natural extension of (i) than (i’), but it would miss the point
that the accumulation of productive resources is now endogenous, as well as the fraction of these resources
that is protected from rent-seeking.
27Both m∗ and mˆ are equal to zero, when ρ = 1/2.
28In such a case a strictly positive m∗ does always exist. This result is not surprising: with endogenous
protection, productive workers produce more (h is higher) and set upweaker defenses (higher extortion rate q);
as a consequence, a rent-seeker who comes in contact with an entrepreneur obtains a higher rent. In addition, as
was already the case with an exogenous q, rent-seekers also benefit frommigration as long as the predator/prey
ratio decreases, there is less crowding-in and their chance to meet a productive worker increases.
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This set of results (Propositions 3 and 4) conveys the message that, roughly speaking,
migration can better solve the rent-seeking problem, thereby improving economic perfor-
mance, only if the opportunity cost of diverting some resources (time) from protection to
accumulation of productive capital is not very high. If it is not the case (ρ ≥ 1/2), the
general result drawn from Section 3 is completely reversed: inducing weaker institutions
and less effective defense against rent-seeking, migration turns out to be harmful for eco-
nomic performance; the best policy option, for the developing country, would be to close
its frontiers to migration outflows.
5 Endogenous migration rate
Throughout the previous Section, we have assumed the probability of migration for pro-
ductive workers to be fixed at the level m, regardless of h and x. Indeed, it could be the
case that the chance of emigration is higher when the human capital of the prospective
migrant is higher. Some destination countries, for instance, tend to select immigrants by
skills: people with more years of education are more likely to be accepted.
To take this possibility into account, we can consider the probability of migration at time
t + 1 as being a function of the investment in productive skills made at time t; neglecting
time indexes, we would have m = z(x). For the sake of simplicity, we choose a linear
specification for z(x), such that m = σx, with 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1: the probability of migration
increases linearly with the quantity of time spent building up productive skills.
The parameter σ measures how efficiently education is transformed into a positive
chance to emigrate; in this framework, an increase in σ would correspond ceteris paribus
to an increased mobility of workers: for any given value of x, a higher σ translates into a
higher probability of migration. Just notice thatσ = 0 corresponds to the autarkic case: the
probability of migration is zero, no matter how many years have been spent accumulating
human capital.
For the rest, the theoretical setup is the same as that of Section 4: in particular, we
assume that the extortion rate q depends positively on x (endogenous protection).
In this new framework, the first thing we may want to look at is the optimal quantity
of time devoted to human capital accumulation, x∗M′ . With qF = 0 (rent-free destination
country), it is given by:
x∗M′ = min
[
(1+α)[ρ− (1− ρ)σ ]−√Λ
2(2+α)ρσ
; 1
]
, (19)
where Λ = (1+α)2[ρ− (1− ρ)σ ]2 − 4α(2+α)ρ2σ .
Ignoring corner solutions, which can be ruled out as long as σ < ρ/(1 +α + ρ), we
can check that ∂x∗M′/∂σ > 0; when σ increases, productive workers will invest more in
education, since: (i) x becomes more decisive in determining their probability of migration,
and (ii) a higher probability of migration raises expected returns to education.
17
This result parallels the one obtained in Section 4, where the optimal x was a positive
function of m. Moreover we can see that, for σ = 0, the autarkic result with endogenous
protection is reproduced, in fact limσ→0 x∗M′ = α/(1−α) (as in expression (9)).
Equating profits and rents, we obtain the equilibrium allocation of talent (the endoge-
nous size of the two groups) as a function of the parameterσ ; before migration takes place,
the proportion pǫ,M′(σ) of people engaging in a rent-seeking career is given by:
ρ{ρ[1+α(σ − 1)2 − (6−σ)σ ]− 2σ [σ − 3+α(σ −α − 3)]− (1+σ)√Λ}+σ [σ(1+α) +√Λ]
2(2+α)2ρσ
.
(20)
Not surprisingly, we have that limσ→0 pǫ,M′(σ) = (α + 1− ρ)/(1 +α) = pǫ (autarky).
But it is very important to notice that, in sharp contrast with our previous analysis, an
increased mobility of skilled workers does not reduce the fraction of educated agents in-
volved in rent-seeking activities. In fact, ∂pǫ,M′(σ)/∂σ is always positive29 (see Appendix
C for a proof) while, in the case of exogenous migration, we had ∂pM(m)/∂m < 0.
To understand how this result is determined, consider that whenm is endogenous (m =
σx), an increase in σ will push productive workers to invest more in x (as stated above); a
larger x, however, will determine weaker protection, i.e. a higher extortion rate q. This lack
of protection will affect heavily the income of those productive agents who cannot migrate:
although the prospective income of successful migrants benefits from higher values of x
andσ , the expected income of productive workers (which is an average of the two) will not
raise that much. On the other hand, the expected income of rent-seekers shifts up notably,
whatever p, since the higher extortion rate q more than compensates a tougher crowding-
in (larger m). To sum up, both expected profits and expected rents increase; however, the
former shifts up by less, thus determining a lower p30.
Therefore, we have a first clue that the moralization effect of migration might not hold
any more, if the probability of migration is endogenous. Such an hypothesis is confirmed
by the inspection of the after-migration predator/prey ratio γǫ,M′(σ) = pǫ,M′(σ)/[(1 −
pǫ,M′(σ))(1−m(σ))], which is given by:
ρ2[1+α − (3+α)ρ] + 2ρ(ρ− 1)[1+α + (2+α)ρ]σ − (1+α)(ρ− 1)3σ2 + [ρ(1+ ρ)− (ρ− 1)2σ ]√Λ
2ρ[ρ2(σ − 1)2 +σ2 − 2ρσ(1+σ)] .
(21)
In fact, after checking that limσ→0 γǫ,M′(σ) = α+(1+α)(1−ρ)/ρ = γǫ = limm→0 γǫ,M(m),
we can also see (Appendix C) that γǫ,M′(σ) is always increasing in σ . Therefore:
Proposition 5 When the probability of migration depends on skill accumulation, an increased mo-
bility of workers does not induce any moralization effect in the sending country.
29For the sake of completeness, consider that a corner solution (x∗M′ = 1) would determine pǫ,M′ (σ) = 1−σ ,
so that the result is reversed.
30Recall that the equilibrium value of p is found as the intersection of the two curves representing expected
profits and expected rent-seeking income, respectively.
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In analogywith our previous analysis, wewould also be interested in assessingwhether
an optimal migration rate exists. However, migration is now endogenous, and then we
may ask whether a strictly positive optimal value forσ (the exogenous parameter affecting
m) exists. For the sake of analytical tractability, we consider only the following objective
function:
ΞM′(σ) = (1−m(x∗M′))(1− pǫ,M′(x∗M′))(1− q(x∗M′))(x∗M′)α ,
where x∗M′ is a function of σ , as we know from (19). The above expression represents the
after-migration total income of high-skilled producers, and corresponds to cases (i) and (i’)
in Sections 3 and 4.
It is immediately evident that the first three terms of the four that concur to determine
ΞM′(σ) are decreasing in σ . Therefore, it is unlikely that a strictly positive σ∗ may exist.
Althoughwe cannot prove it analytically, in Appendix Cwewill use numerical simulations
to show that ΞM′(σ) is monotonically decreasing inσ for a wide range of parameter values.
Therefore, if the probability of migration depends on human capital, opening frontiers
unambiguously hurts the sending economy31.
We can now summarize our theoretical results. When the probability of migration does
not depend on skills, a strictly positive optimal migration ratem∗ always exists with exoge-
nous protection, while it exists only for some parameter configurations under endogenous
protection. Similarly, migration always induces a more favorable allocation of talent with
exogenous protection, and for values ofmwhich are not too large in the case of endogenous
protection. However, if protection is endogenous and the likelihood of migration depends
on human capital accumulation, the moralization effect disappears and there is no strictly
positive optimal value forσ , i.e. for the parameter that determines the migration chance m.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the interplay between probabilistic migration and the en-
dogenous allocation of talent, as well as its consequences for economic performance in the
concerned country.
We started by presenting some stylized facts. Across countries, the skilled migration
rate appears to be positively (negatively) correlated with the fraction of educated agents
who specialize in productive (rent-seeking) fields. However, we see that this kind of corre-
lation is not preserved if instead of the relative size of parasitic and productive groups we
31It is important to underline that our representation of an endogenous probability of migration considers
all the agents who have access to human capital enhancement as being the same vis-à-vis their educational pos-
sibilities. It would be more realistic to introduce some heterogeneity, through a distribution of innate abilities
in transforming x in h, and deal with the possible self-selection of migrants, but the model would be extremely
difficult to handle. Therefore, we propose to interpret our model as a polar case, useful to show how shifting
from random to endogenousmigration affects the relationship between labor mobility and rent-seeking.
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consider the total amount of rent-seeking, that we measure through a perceived corruption
index and which also involves an appreciation of rent-seeking intensity.
Then, we have built a simple model showing how, on purely theoretical grounds, prob-
abilistic migration can be expected to induce a moralizing effect in an economy affected
by a severe problem of rent-seeking and corruption: in such a case a positive income-
maximizing migration rate can be identified.
However, we have also pointed out that these quite optimistic findings rest on an ad-
mittedly simple assumption, namely that the effectiveness of rent-seeking is exogenously
determined. In fact, this kind of result may beweakened ormay not hold anymore once en-
dogenous protection is taken into account, depending on how efficiently productive agents
can manage to defend themselves against rent-seekers, and possibly on the quality of in-
stitutions and political culture in the developing country. Moreover, if not only protection
but also migration is made endogenous, there is even less room for a positive role of skilled
labor mobility in the perspective of reducing rent-seeking.
As interesting extensions, and possible directions for further research, we would sug-
gest: (i) to explore the growth implications of migration in a OLG model with joint rent-
seeking/income dynamics, (ii) to analyze possible strategic complementarities between bu-
reaucratic behavior and innovation, (iii) to endogenize the skill distribution of productive
workers, and (iv) to endogenize the offensive effort of rent-seekers (prospecting a decrease
in rents due to the lack of potential prey, migration may induce parasitic agents to soften
their pressure on productive workers).
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A Existence of a strictly positive m∗ with endogenous protection
(Proposition 4)
In Section 4, we have already shown under which conditions a strictly positive m∗ does ex-
ist, when the objective function is specified as in (i’). Let us now consider function (ii’):
in this case it is not possible to obtain an analytical expression for m∗. In fact, calling
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ΦM(m) the after-migration average income of honest producers, we see that the equation
∂ΦM(m)/∂m = 0 does not admit closed form solutions. However, it is possible to identify
conditions under which a strictly positive m∗ may exist.
After recalling that in Section 4 we assumed m < ρ/[α(1− qF) + ρ] to rule out corner
solutions, and that we are now working with qF = 0, it is easy to check that:
lim
m→0
∂ΦM(m)
∂m =
(
α
1+α
)α
ρ(1− 2ρ)χ
[ρ+ χ(1+α)]2
and
lim
m→ρ/(α+ρ)
∂ΦM(m)
∂m = −
ρ(α + ρ)2
(1+α)[αρ+ (α + ρ)2χ]
.
It is clear that the second limit is always negative. If the first limit is positive, and that is
the case as long as ρ < 1/2, we are ensured that 0 < m∗ < ρ/(α + ρ). If ρ ≥ 1/2, a strictly
positive m∗ fails to exist.
B An alternative specification for the social objective function:
the after-migration average income (including rents)
The results we have obtained in Section 3 and 4 were based on the assumption that the
utility of rent-seekers should not be included in the social objective function. However,
this needs not necessarily be the case. Suppose in fact that the identity of rent-seekers
and entrepreneurs is anonymous a priori and thus the social planner feels committed to
maximizing the well-being of the whole population, regardless of their career choice. In
such a case an appropriate objective function would be the after-migration average income
(including rents in the count).
B.1 Exogenous protection
Assuming for the moment that the extortion rate q is exogenous, the objective function
writes as:
{(1−m)[1− pM(m)](1− q) + pM(m)[(1−m)(1− pM(m))/pM(m)]q}h
(1−m)[1− pM(m)] + pM(m) + χ ;
the optimal migration rate is then given by:
m∗
′
= max

0 ; q + χ− (1− qF)
√
qχ(1+χ)
q−qF
q + χqF

 , (22)
that is strictly positive provided that qF < [q2 + χ(2q− 1)]/[q(1+ χ)].
With qF = 0, we have that m∗
′
= [q + χ −√χ(1+ χ)]/q; this optimal m is always
positive, since we assumed q > 1/2.
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It is worth noting that m∗′ , like m∗ (as given by (7)), is increasing in q: the higher the ex-
tortion rate in the sending economy, the larger the optimal migration rate. Not surprisingly,
we can also check that m∗′ > m∗. This depends on the fact that, when adding rent-seekers
to the computation of average income, there is no additional "drain effect" to be accounted
for: parasitic agents do not migrate and average rents, depending directly on the preda-
tor/prey ratio (see the objective function above), are always increasing in m.
B.2 Endogenous protection
The suitable objective function, call it ΘM(m), now becomes:
{(1−m)[1− pǫ,M(x∗M)](1− q(x∗M)) + pǫ,M(x∗M)[(1−m)(1− pǫ,M(x∗M))/pǫ,M(x∗M)]q(x∗M)}h(x∗M)
(1−m)[1− pǫ,M(x∗M)] + pǫ,M(x∗M) + χ
.
In this case it is not possible to obtain an analytical expression for the optimal migration
rate m∗′ , since the equation ∂ΘM(m)/∂m = 0 does not admit closed form solutions.
However, it is possible to identify conditions under which a strictly positive m∗′ exists.
In fact, assuming that qF = 0, it can be shown that:
lim
m→0
∂ΘM(m)
∂m =
αα(1+α)−α−2[(1+α − ρ)2 + (1+α)(1+α − 2ρ)χ]
(1+ χ)2
and
lim
m→ρ/(α+ρ)
∂ΘM(m)
∂m =
(α + ρ)2[α(α +α2 − ρ2) + (1+α)(α − ρ)(α + ρ)χ]
(1+α)[α(α+ 2ρ) + (α + ρ)2χ]2
.
A sufficient condition for the first limit to be positive is that ρ < (1 +α)/2. But this coin-
cides with the restriction ρ < ρ¯ in Section 4. We are then ensured thatm∗′ is strictly positive,
as long as corner solutions are ruled out. Moreover, if ρ > α
√
(1+α)(1+ χ)/[α + (1+α)χ]
the second limit is negative, and we are sure that 0 < m∗ < ρ/(α+ ρ).
Therefore, Proposition 4 does not hold any more if the objective function includes rents
as well. To understand why, consider that when protection is endogenous, productive
workers produce more (h is higher) and set up weaker defenses (higher extortion rate q); as
a consequence, a rent-seeker who comes in contact with an entrepreneur is able to obtain
a higher rent. Moreover, as was already the case with an exogenous q, rent-seekers also
benefit frommigration as long as the predator/prey ratio decreases, there is less crowding-
in and the probability to meet a productive worker increases. From the viewpoint of a
policy maker who also cares about rent-seekers’ welfare, the optimal m would never be 0.
C Endogenous migration: proofs and numerical simulations
First, we want to prove that both pǫ,M′(σ) and γǫ,M′(σ) (as defined in Section 5) are increas-
ing in σ . For ease of exposition, we will present our computations in the case of α = 1.
However, our results fully generalize to other values ofα between 0 and 1.
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We can write:
∂pǫ,M′(σ)
∂σ = −
[ρ(σ − 1)−σ ]{2ρ2 + (ρ− 4)ρσ + 2(ρ− 1)2σ2 − 2[ρ+ (ρ− 1)σ ]√ζ}
18ρσ2
√
ζ
, (23)
where ζ = [ρ+ (ρ− 1)σ ]2 − 3ρ2σ .
For derivative (23) to be positive, we needσ > ρ/(ρ− 1), which is always verified with
ρ < 1, since σ is assumed to take positive values.
A fortiori, also γǫ,M′(σ) is increasing in σ . In fact:
γǫ,M′(σ) =
pǫ,M′(σ)
(1− pǫ,M′(σ))(1−m(σ)) ,
and we have already proved that the numerator pǫ,M′(σ) increases with σ , while the de-
nominator is a negative function of σ .
In addition, we present the output of some numerical simulations, in order to show that
a strictly positive value of σ which maximizes function ΞM′(σ) (as specified in Section 5)
seems not to exist.
After fixing ρ = 0.4, in Figure 6 we have drawn ΞM′(σ) for α = 0.2, α = 0.55 and
α = 0.9, respectively. In all cases, ΞM′(σ) is monotonically decreasing in σ . This holds true
for every 0 < α ≤ 1, and whatever ρ.
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Figure 6: The function ΞM′(σ)
Although we are not able to prove it analytically, it is then possible to say that a strictly
positive σ∗ should not exist. This stands in sharp contrast with the results we obtained
throughout Sections 3 and 4 (exogenous protection).
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